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This query looks at the role of regular UN humanitarian forums that involve conflict parties in 
conflict situations to discuss humanitarian issues of concern. It focuses on forums that are held 
outside of any political processes or peace talks. It provides examples and lessons from those 
forums. 
This paper finds only six examples of forums that meet two or more of the criteria, although 
several of these are informal and/or linked to a political process. Forums such as the Technical 
Committee on Humanitarian Assistance (TCHA) in Sudan (1998-2000) and the Nuba Mountains 
Programme Advancing Conflict Transformation (NMPACT) in Sudan (2002-2007) have allowed 
humanitarian issues to be discussed in a co-ordinated way among United Nations (UN) 
organisations and/or Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and parties to the conflict. This 
can lead to better technical co-ordination, a distribution of aid according to humanitarian 
principles rather than strategic negotiations, and a greater acceptance of humanitarian principles 
among the warring parties. However, the success of such forums is highly context-specific and 
depends upon their format, personnel and tactics, as well as the broader political context and the 
tactics and capabilities of the conflict parties. The forums risk legitimising the conflict parties and 
allowing aid to be instrumentalised. 
Some key challenges shape the space humanitarian actors have for engaging in regular forums 
with conflict parties. Firstly, so-called ‘complex emergencies’ after the Cold War have changed 
the context for humanitarian action, and brought distinct challenges to implementing 
humanitarian principles and maintaining humanitarian space. Wars involving state and non-state 
actors make it difficult for humanitarians to gain access and threaten humanitarian principles. 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) states that humanitarian organisations may offer help to 
populations in need provided consent is given. However, agreeing access with non-state groups 
may confer legitimacy on those groups. The process of negotiating access may also lead to aid 
becoming instrumentalised in military or political strategies.  
Secondly, the UN introduced a ‘policy of integration’ in 1997, whereby UN peacekeeping, 
security and humanitarian agencies are linked together. Many aid agencies and scholars feel that 
the UN’s policy of integration has contributed to a squeezing of ‘humanitarian space’. Evidence 
from interviews points to a perception that aid is linked with UN political goals in contexts such as 
Somalia and Afghanistan, and a subsequent reduction in the efficacy of aid delivery (Keogh & 
Ruijters, 2012; Steets, Reichhold, & Sagmeister, 2012). Third, on a more technical level, the 
cluster system introduced in 2005, was implemented to improve co-ordination between NGOs. 
However, it can lead to similar problems as ‘integration’, especially where peacekeeping or other 
political issues are being led by a cluster member (Metcalfe, Giffen, & Elhawary, 2011, p. 27). 
Fourth, anti-terrorism legislation has also brought restrictions on NGO interactions with terrorist 
organisations such as Hamas and Al-Shabaab. As the territory governed by these organisations 
has some of the highest levels of humanitarian need, the lack of access to it has impeded 
humanitarian work considerably.  
Humanitarian organisations and the UN have tried various methods to overcome these problems, 
including co-ordination mechanisms and the formulation of joint operating principles. 
Regular forums offer a way to engage both sides during a conflict. They stand in contrast to the 
more ad-hoc negotiation of access used by many humanitarian organisations on the ground. 
They can be used to help implement ‘joint operating principles’ or ‘ground rules’ uniformly across 
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a conflict-affected state. They can also help to negotiate humanitarian access in situations where 
conflict is preventing it. It has been argued that these high-level forums are an effective way to 
ensure that humanitarian principles are adhered to by all parties in a war, and ensure a separate 
‘humanitarian space’. 
This report is divided into two sections: 
 The first section of the report lists examples of forums, discussing the context in which 
they worked, their format, and their successes and failures. 
 The second section discusses some general lessons regarding the forums, including 
from cases which only partly meet the criteria, or where a forum is absent.  
This paper finds only one example of a forum that entirely meet the specificities of this query, 
however five additional examples of forums may offer transferable lessons and are therefore 
included below. There is little direct discussion of UN-led forums in the literature. Most of the 
literature focused on negotiating humanitarian space and disseminating humanitarian principles 
includes high-level negotiation as only one facet. For reasons of sensitivity, some forums have 
generated little published research. However, conclusions can be drawn from the strengths and 
weaknesses identified in cases where such forums are not used: informal forums negotiations 
not including parties to a conflict, those linking humanitarian issues to political goals, and more 
locally based policies. Much of the literature discusses the difficulties of negotiating access with 
conflict parties through the UN. The evidence found does not address gender issues.  
2. Examples of forums 
2.1 Technical Committee on Humanitarian Assistance (TCHA) in 
Sudan, 1998-2000 
The TCHA was a high-level forum where the Government of the Republic of Sudan (GoS), the 
Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the United Nations met to discuss 
humanitarian issues related to the conflict. It met in Rome on 16-18 November 1998, Oslo on 25-
26 May 1999, Geneva on 14-15 December 1999 and Geneva on 2-3 November 2000.  
The TCHA was at the time one of the few humanitarian committees to feature non-state actors 
alongside governments. It grew out of the limitations of Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), the 
multilateral operation begun in 1989 to provide humanitarian aid to both sides during the ongoing 
conflict in the country. This OLS agreement was novel at the time in that it required ‘the 
Sudanese government to cede partial sovereignty to the UN in areas controlled by the rebel 
movements’ (Bradbury, Leader, & Mackintosh, 2000, p. 27). However, access under OLS was 
negotiated with the Sudanese government, and split between northern and southern sectors, and 
as such did not always correlate with humanitarian need. Because of this ad hoc nature, the 
government of Sudan became dominant and interfered with or delayed aid for its own purposes 
(Barbelet, 2008, p. 325).  
As a result of the instrumentalisation of aid and security threats to humanitarian workers, 
OLS drafted ‘an agreement on ground rules’ for humanitarian access, which were signed by the 
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), the Southern Sudan Independence 
Movement/Army (SSIM/A) and the SPLA-United in 1995. However, the Sudanese government 
rejected OLS’s attempt to include it in the ground rules in 1996. As a consequence, ‘differences 
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between the northern and southern sectors [were] problematic for the implementation of the 
Ground Rules’ (Bradbury et al., 2000, p. 38).  
The TCHA was devised as one way of sustaining the principled engagement on issues in 
Sudan. It discussed principles of access, assistance, protection, the rights of civilian 
beneficiaries, security protocols, humanitarian ceasefires and access corridors. Unlike the 
‘Agreement on Ground Rules’, the TCHA included representatives from both warring parties. It 
therefore risked legitimating the rebel groups. It provided a forum for the discussion of 
humanitarian issues and greater acceptance of humanitarian principles. 
2.2 The UN Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit (UHAC), 
Angola, 1993-2000 
The Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit in Angola, or Unidade de Coordenação para 
Assistençia Humanitaria, (UCAH), was established by the United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) in April 1993. It was explicitly designed to be 
independent of the political work of the UN, which was seen as implicated in the failed peace 
plan, and to arrange aid for both sides. UCAH did not meet both parties together, but rather 
acted as a point of contact for both when arranging the humanitarian aid, through shuttle 
diplomacy rather than a formal forum. 
Since 1975, Angola had been in conflict between the Soviet- and Cuba-backed People's 
Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the US- and apartheid South Africa-backed 
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The end of the Cold War saw the 
withdrawal of foreign backers, and more scope for humanitarian needs to be met.  
UCAH aimed to improve on the UN’s 1990-1 Special Relief Programme for Angola (SRPA).  
Although both sides agreed to ‘cross-line’ aid, in practice aid was frequently manipulated. UCAH 
did not have the staff on the ground to provide accurate needs assessment, and so was more 
vulnerable to the warring parties’ exaggerated figures (Richardson, 2002, pp. 77–79). War broke 
out again following elections in September 1992, following which humanitarian access became 
limited and ad hoc. 
In May 1993, UCAH set out an Emergency Relief Plan (ERP). Its principles and strategies 
included guarantees of humanitarian access and impartiality, and that ‘the government of Angola 
and UNITA identify and make available suitably qualified technical personnel to assist in 
programme implementation’ 
The aims of UCAH were: to foster strategies for addressing humanitarian needs created by the 
Angolan crisis; to negotiate access and protect humanitarian space; and to promote a coherent 
and effective humanitarian response. 
Both the GoA and UNITA agreed in principle to the plan following peace talks led by the UN. 
However, the ERP was halted almost immediately when the first aid plane to enter UNITA 
territory was shot at. According to Richardson (2002, p. 88), ‘It is widely believed that this attempt 
to initiate the ERP failed because it was still seen as being linked to the political process. The 
plan had been handed to the two sides by the SRSG [Special Representative of the UN 
Secretary General], in the context of political negotiations’. From this point, UCAH decided to 
emphatically divorce its work form the political work of the UN, and to stop cross-line 
convoys (Jackson & Davey, 2014). 
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UCAH never dealt with the two sides at the same time but rather engaged in ‘shuttle 
diplomacy’. UNITA’s new Humanitarian Assistance Coordinator (HAC), part of the movement’s 
Foreign Ministry, and the GoA’s Ministry for Social Assistance and Reintegration both worked 
through UCAH. The GoA could be contacted easily in Luanda, and UCAH placed a 
representative in the UNITA-held city of Huambo to talk to the HAC, although as the status of the 
war changed this contact was not always possible. This aspect of UCAH is seen as having been 
effective in focusing negotiations and giving less scope for playing NGOs and UN agencies off 
each other (Richardson, 2002). 
The GoA had to authorise any contact with UNITA and insisted that its sovereignty ‘be reflected 
in the tone and conduct of the negotiations.’ It was consulted, whereas UNITA simply had the 
option to consent (Richardson, 2002). Nevertheless, UCAH was point of contact for both sides 
which helped in the implementation of programmes. 
UCAH field advisers, present in seven provincial capitals, were vital in running the ERP as they 
shared information and maintained a radio network. This allowed UCAH to gain information 
separately from the warring parties (Richardson, 2002, p. 94). 
Nevertheless, UCAH always struggled to agree the delivery of aid according to humanitarian 
principles as both sides sought to use it for their own ends. According to Toby Lanzer (1996, p. 
17), who worked for UCAH, the organisation’s work faltered primarily because of ‘linkage’. For 
instance, UNITA did not accept the principle of aid based on need. Although most of the need 
was in GoA-held areas, UNITA insisted on an equal split of aid. Convoys were frequently held up 
by such demands from both sides. In the contested city of Kuito in 1993, for example, UCAH had 
negotiated a strict procedure for the delivery of aid, including inspection by a humanitarian 
committee of GoA and UNITA members and checkpoints for humanitarian workers (Lanzer, 
1996, p. 34). 
UCAH also sought to build capacity among the warring parties, in anticipation of a peace 
settlement and with the possibility of gaining access to areas previously blocked by the war. 
Following the Lusaka Peace Agreement in December 1994, UCAH set up the Humanitarian 
Coordination Group which dealt with both sides in Luanda. It aimed to:  
 improve general understanding of the humanitarian crisis in Angola by promoting needs 
assessments and sectoral evaluation missions; 
 monitor access to civilians in need and make recommendations to the Joint Commission, 
as necessary; 
 gather and analyse information to make recommendations concerning food security; 
 track financial contributions to the 1995 Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Angola and 
encourage donors to support NGO programmes; 
 facilitate information exchange with donors and NGOs about humanitarian needs and the 
financial and human resource capacity to respond; and 
 keep the Joint Commission informed about the humanitarian situation in the country. 
Overall, the effectiveness of UCAH and its predecessor the SRPA were limited. Hilshorst and 
Serrano (2010) argue that UCAH’s ‘performance and credibility changed over time as 
humanitarian and UN peacebuilding activities became increasingly intertwined, compromising the 
UN’s ability to avoid cooption by the warring parties’. Independence from the peace processes, 
particularly in 1993-4, allowed it to build more trust with the warring parties and to work 
effectively (Enrico Pavignani & Alessandro Colombo, 2005). However, the persistent attempts of 
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both the GoA and UNITA to instrumentalise aid as part of ongoing hostilities meant that in most 
of the periods following, much aid was not delivered on humanitarian principles. 
 
2.3 Nuba Mountains Programme Advancing Conflict 
Transformation (NMPACT) in Sudan, 2002-2007 
The Nuba Mountains Programme Advancing Conflict Transformation (NMPACT) was a 
humanitarian forum for the implementation of humanitarian work in the Nuba Mountains. It was 
attended by both the government and the rebels fighting in the area, as well as a number of 
NGOs and representatives of the Nuba people. Pantuliano (2005) describes it as ‘the only 
operational programme in Sudan subscribed to by both warring parties’. It ran from 2002 to 2007.  
NMPACT came about from following diplomatic pressure from the UN and aid agencies, who felt 
that the Government of Sudan (GoS) was using aid to lure people into territory it controlled. Many 
aid agencies therefore withdrew from GoS-controlled areas in 2000-1 as a way to exert pressure 
on the government. This pressure led to a January 2002 ceasefire agreement (CFA) monitored 
by a Joint Military Commission/Joint Monitoring Mission (JMC/JMM). NMPACT was linked to 
the ceasefire and co-operated with the military monitors, so cannot be said to have been 
independent of a peace process. 
As well as external pressure, the existence of humanitarian wings, developed following 
Operation Lifeline Sudan, within both warring parties, helped make NMPACT successful. The 
GoS’s Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) and the SPLM’s Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation 
Association (SRRC) were made up of technical humanitarian workers, separate from military or 
political structures. 
Neither did it have purely ‘humanitarian’ aims. Its strategic goal was ‘to enhance the Nuba 
people’s capacity for self-reliance within a sustained process of conflict transformation guided by 
the aspirations, priorities and analyses of the Nuba people themselves.’ As part of this it 
addressed several issues. It was focused on creating sustainable solutions for the Nuba 
people, which included mapping land tenure to return what was taken from displaced persons, 
and conflict between nomad groups and farmers. 
Nevertheless, the engagement of the humanitarian organisations of the SPLM/M and the GoS is 
seen to have been an effective mechanism for implementation. The involvement of both the 
government and the rebels in regular forums ‘gave them a strong sense of buy-in into the 
programme, towards which they consistently showed strong commitment and interest in 
facilitating its speedy implementation’ (Pantuliano, 2005). It allowed for humanitarian and 
development issues to be addressed equitably, i.e. across lines and based on humanitarian 
criteria. The use of a forum in neutral locations is also seen to have brought both sides together. 
2.4 UNOHAC in Mozambique, 1992-1994 
The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOHAC) was set 
up in 1992 to co-ordinate humanitarian aid. It was part of the integrated United Nations Operation 
in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) which oversaw the peace process between the government 
(Frelimo) and rebel forces (Renamo) in the country. 
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In practice, UNOHAC was distinct from other UN agencies in Mozambique. It also began 
operating about a year before ONUMOZ, meaning that it had, and was perceived as having, 
autonomy from the peace process (Barnes, 1998, p. 22). Donini argues that ‘integration existed 
only on paper’ (Donini, 1996, p. 67). 
Many of the structures and personnel of UNOHAC came from a predecessor organisation, the 
United Nations Special Coordinator for Emergency Relief Operations (UNSCERO) which ran 
from 1987 to 1993. However, UNSCERO would only work in rebel-controlled areas with 
permission from the government, meaning that in practice the ICRC was the only organisation 
working in rebel-controlled areas (Barnes, 1998, p. 15).  
The beginnings of a peace process in 1990 and a drought in 1992 led to a desire for a more co-
ordinated way of arranging access to at-need populations. Before a peace agreement was 
signed, in July 1992, the government of Mozambique and Renamo signed a ‘Declaration of 
Principles’ stating that humanitarian aid would be impartial, without discrimination, and that they 
would not use aid for military goals. Following this, it was decided that UNOHAC would replace 
UNSCERO as part of the integrated UN mission. 
UNOHAC’s aims were to: 
• coordinate, with the government and Renamo, emergency activities and humanitarian 
programs of UN agencies, bilateral donors, and NGOs;  
• ensure speedy delivery of emergency commodities and eliminate duplication of effort;  
• gather, evaluate, and disseminate information on humanitarian programs and provide 
regular updates of unmet and additional needs;  
• maintain a comprehensive database on donor contributions, commitments, and 
expenditures and track the progress of programs;  
• advise on the use of humanitarian aid with special emphasis on the reintegration of 
returning refugees, the internally displaced, demobilized soldiers, and vulnerable groups; and  
• manage trust funds established by the UN for demobilization, demining, and for Renamo. 
UNOHAC chaired a weekly Technical Committee with representatives from both warring sides 
and NGOs. The discussion was largely decentralised and saw genuine engagement between 
sides. According to Barnes:  
‘The field presence was a critical part of UNOHAC’s coordination mechanism and perhaps 
UNOHAC’s most effective and operational coordination contribution. Provincial Humanitarian 
Assistance Committees functioned as important bridging mechanisms in which, under a UN 
banner, Government and Renamo worked together with humanitarian organisations to assess 
needs, establish priorities and deliver assistance to the most needy areas. Valuable information 
was gathered on needs in previously inaccessible areas, and was passed on through UNOHAC to 
the international community’ (Barnes, 1998, p. 23). 
 
2.5 Humanitarian Working Group in Bosnia, 1992-1995 
The Humanitarian Issues Working Group (HIWG) was a working group of the International 
Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), established in 1992. It was chaired by the UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and included representatives from all conflict parties. 
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The UNHCR’s evaluation on working with armed groups recounts: 
‘when UNHCR was the lead agency in Bosnia, responsible for feeding millions of 
people, the High Commissioner sat down the Serb, Croat and Bosniak leaders in her 
office and pushed each party to sign an agreement opening up supply routes before 
winter struck affected communities. The meeting was not a courtesy call; at one point 
the High Commissioner threatened to withdraw from Bosnia entirely if the three sides 
refused to cooperate’ (Keogh & Ruijters, 2012). 
The ICFY was to be the basis for a peace settlement. HIWG was guided by ‘Programme of 
Action on Humanitarian Issues’ from the London session of the ICFY in August 1992. All parties 
to the working group had agreed to a statement of principles, including to comply with 
international humanitarian law and ‘that the provision of humanitarian assistance should be 
carried out impartially and on a non-political basis for the benefit of all those affected by the 
conflict’. The working group also endorsed the ‘Comprehensive Response to the Humanitarian 
Crisis in the Former Yugoslavia’ a seven-point plan proposed by UNHCR at the International 
Meeting on Humanitarian Aid for Victims of the Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia on 29 July 
1992. The HIWG’s work included monitoring, commitments from the warring parties and 
appeals (Rossanet, 1994). 
However, on the ground, the conflict parties set the agenda. Frequent changes in humanitarian 
personnel and poor humanitarian co-ordination enabled this. The warring parties often did not 
honour their commitments and proved deceptive. They played off UN peacekeepers 
(UNPROFOR) against UNHCR. UNCHR had, in practice, to accept reciprocity. On many 
occasions, it gave aid for access, or delivered equal amounts to opposing sides, rather than on 
the basis of assessed need (Cutts, 1999; Young, 2001, p. 790). 
2.6 Humanitarian Task Force (HTF) in Syria 
The Humanitarian Task Force (HTF) is part of the ISSG (International Syrian Support Group), 
a multilateral body set up in 2015 to help end the conflict.  
While the ISSG does not include any of the warring parties, it does include their main sponsors. 
It is chaired by the US and Russia and includes China, Egypt, the EU, France, Germany, Iran, 
Iraq, Italy, Jordan, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the UEA, the UK, the 
UN, the US, the Arab League, Australia, Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, the Organization of 
Islamic Cooperation and Spain. 
By including the Syrian government’s main sponsors, Russia and Iran, the task force aims to get 
cross-line aid to hard-to-reach areas.  It has achieved small successes in widening 
humanitarian access and civilian protection on the ground (Lund, 2018). 
However, in-depth evaluations of the task force remain scare. 
3. Lessons from forums 
3.1 Formal and informal forums 
While the TCHA was a formal, high-level and UN backed forum for the discussion of 
humanitarian issues, many others do not entirely conform to this model. Barbelet (2008) notes 
that agreements on humanitarian matters ‘can be "formal" with the signature of a document or 
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informal with some types of oral consent from the parties involved. Agreements may be 
formatted in a universal declaration or flexible in content. Agreements may be multilateral and all 
inclusive (involving all parties to the conflict including different factions, the government and 
humanitarian actors), bilateral (between an armed group and a humanitarian actor), or unilateral 
(statements made by ANSAs)’. 
Informal contact can be useful in negotiating access. Donors and the UN are wary of 
legitimising groups such as Al-Shabaab in Somalia or Hamas in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories (oPt) (Mackintosh & Duplat, 2013). Many humanitarian forums were not documented 
for reasons of sensitivity, but low-profile engagement occurs in Syria, while the Salaam Support 
Group regularly meets with the Taliban in Doha. Governments fighting an armed non-state actor 
(ANSA) are often reluctant to enter into formal structures with them for fear of ceding legitimacy. 
Informal contacts are often the only way to gain access where there is a strong asymmetry 
between the sides. In Angola, the government insisted that negotiations with the rebel group, 
UNITA, ‘were to be conducted by lower ranking UN officials than those with the government’, but 
agreed to cross-line aid in principle (Richardson, 2002). The ensuing ‘shuttle diplomacy’ provided 
in informal forum to agree humanitarian access. 
NGOs often negotiate informally with ANSAs, or work across the lines. Fiona Terry (2011) 
provides one example of an informal ‘forum’ which allowed the government to communicate with 
an armed non-state actor in the ICRC’s work in Afghanistan. She describes how, seeking to work 
in a polarised situation, the ICRC undertook ‘innovative and sometimes risky’ initiatives. Starting 
from the dilemma that ‘security guarantees depend upon the effectiveness of operations, yet the 
possibility to operate depends upon security guarantees’, the ICRC undertook back-to-basics 
work, such as family tracing, medical work and first-aid training, in Taliban-controlled areas. It 
formed a health shura (council) to work with the opposition, which prompted President Karzai to 
request ‘the delegation’s help in contacting the insurgents with regard to the vaccination 
campaign.’ In 2009, the ICRC negotiated a humanitarian ceasefire between the US and 
opposition forces to allow humanitarian access to cholera victims in Kandahar (Terry, 2011). In 
this case, the ICRC itself functioned as a forum through which the government and the 
Taliban could co-operate on humanitarian issues, albeit on a very ad hoc and unstructured 
basis. Such informal forums can have the advantage of allowing limited discussion of 
humanitarian issues in contexts where, for whatever reason, there are none.  
However, informal structures carry risks. UNOCHA’s guide to humanitarian negotiations with 
armed groups warns that unplanned and unstructured, armed groups are more likely to try and 
leverage humanitarian access for political gain (Gerard McHugh and Manuel Bessler, 2006). 
Informality can also lead to the exacerbation of power asymmetries. In the case of Sudan, the ad 
hoc nature of Operation Lifeline Sudan II (from 1990), saw the government of Sudan (GoS) 
become increasingly dominant in discussions (Barbelet, 2008; Terry et al., 2014). Similarly, in 
Angola, the UCAH dealt the Government (GoA) and the rebels (UNITA) separately, and 
emphasised that its role was not to mediate. However, its 1993 relief plan faltered because of 
attempts by both sides to achieve ‘linkage’ between relief and strategic goals, and ensure that 
relief given to one side was given to the other (Lanzer, 1996). 
Some forums include a declaration of principles as a way of avoiding instrumentalisation. In 
1992, the Mozambique government (Frelimo) and the rebel group (Renamo) signed such a 
declaration on humanitarian issues, agreeing to impartial assistance, safe passage for 
humanitarians, and to not seek military advantage (Donini, 1996). In Afghanistan, the 
formalisation of principles through a strategic framework in 1997 was a way for aid organisations 
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to present a common face to the Taliban and prevent agencies being played off against each 
other (Donini, 2004). 
3.2 Forums in relation to other processes 
Forums for humanitarian issues may be formally separate from political goals or peace 
processes, but nevertheless should be understood in the context of political processes. It is 
seen to be difficult to institute humanitarian forums to operate in conflicts fuelled by outside 
actors (e.g. Afghanistan, Syria). Donini, surveying the history of humanitarian engagement in 
Afghanistan, notes the shortcomings of the humanitarian agreement made by the UN 
Coordinator Sadruddin Aga Khan in 1988. Because of the highly anti-Soviet views of many 
Afghans, and the role of Pakistan in controlling entry for UN aid, it was very hard to deliver aid in 
a principled manner, and the agreement carried little weight. Indeed, he points to the subsequent 
‘warlord’ and Taliban eras as more conducive to the principled delivery of aid (Donini, 2004). In 
Syria, the use of a UN forum involving the main funders of the warring parties has been seen as 
necessary to leverage humanitarian access. What little progress has been made on humanitarian 
ceasefires and corridors has come about through great power leverage rather than regular 
humanitarian forums. 
The balance of power of the conflict affects how parties will engage with the forum. In ‘strong 
states pursuing their own security and political agenda’, such as Sri Lanka, the space for 
humanitarian forums that include rebel groups can be extremely limited. Similarly, states where a 
Western power or the UN is leading an intervention or stabilisation, such as Afghanistan, might 
offer limited scope for humanitarian discussion. Weaker states may be more amenable to 
international pressure on humanitarian issues, as might those undergoing a peace process 
(Harvey, 2013, pp. S163-164).  
The success of the NMPACT forum in the Nuba Mountains of Southern Sudan came about 
following diplomatic pressure from the UN and aid agencies in 2000-1 as a way to prevent the 
government’s attempts to use its blockade of SPLM-held areas to control the situation. NMPACT 
was linked to the 2002 ceasefire agreement (CFA) and the Joint Military Commission/Joint 
Monitoring Mission (JMC/JMM). The NMPACT programme is seen to have been successful in 
delivering impartial and proportionate humanitarian assistance across the lines. It would 
nevertheless not have been possible without diplomatic pressure from outside (Pantuliano, 
2005). The humanitarian forum in Mozambique, UNOHAC, was also linked to a peace process. 
Institutionally, it remained separate from the peace mission, but it was undertaken at a time when 
both sides had agreed to peace talks. 
Slim (2004) identifies the value of ‘moving seamlessly between humanitarian and political 
discussion of the crisis’ in the case of the 2004 N’djamena talks on Darfur. The ‘Humanitarian 
Ceasefire Agreement on the Conflict in Darfur’ was brought about following peace talks, led by 
the international community. Humanitarian issues were discussed when political issues became 
too hard. However, political pressure was needed to bring the parties to the table. 
However, in many cases one of the main advantages of humanitarian forums or technical 
committees is that they are separate from political processes. UCAH’s success in Angola 
during 1993-4 was based on a clear separation from the UN’s more political work (Richardson, 
2002; Lanzer, 1996). By contrast, humanitarian issues are harder to discuss with all parties in 
contexts where the UN has led an integrated mission, or where humanitarian work has been 
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closely linked to a military force. Many studies criticise UN integration because of this, and 
emphasise the need for separate humanitarian presence (Steets et al., 2012).  
Particularly when they are led by UN agencies, UN actors have been able to effectively 
distinguish themselves from political processes, or perceptions of Western ideology. A 
European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) evaluation of humanitarian 
access in the face of integration notes that: 
‘Observers often argue that armed groups do not distinguish between different branches and 
agencies of the UN. Most interviewees consulted for this evaluation, by contrast, were 
adamant that politically motivated armed groups, such as Al-Shabab in Somalia or the Afghan 
Taliban, know the differences between the UN’s political or military wings and UN 
humanitarian agencies. The Taliban’s leadership has issued a number of public statements 
calling on humanitarian organizations to distance themselves from UN actors who support the 
Afghan government militarily or through civilian reconstruction and development efforts’ 
(Steets et al., 2012).  
3.3 Factors on the ground 
In a several cases, warring parties have agreed to abide by humanitarian principles at high-level 
forums but done little to implement them on the ground. In Bosnia, a rapid turnover of 
humanitarian staff and a lack of co-ordination among agencies meant they could do little to 
prevent aid being instrumentalised (Cutts, 1999). In Angola, the Special Relief Programme for 
Angola (SRPA) was compromised by the inability of the UN to provide its own needs 
assessments to counter the warring parties exaggerated figures. The later deployment of field 
advisers to channel information is seen to have helped the humanitarian effort (Richardson, 
2002; Lanzer, 1996). 
Studies also point to the value of local-level engagement with both sides in building consensus 
and ‘buy-in’ on humanitarian issues. In the case of NMPACT in Sudan, the ‘full involvement of 
HAC and SRRC in the coordination structure gave them a strong sense of buy-in into the 
programme, towards which they consistently showed strong commitment and interest in 
facilitating its speedy implementation’ (Pantuliano, 2005). Similarly, in Mozambique, provincial 
committees involving both sides produced valuable needs assessments (Barnes, 1998). This 
sustained engagement on issues is also seen as one of the key achievements of cross-line 
forums.  
The ideology and capabilities of the conflict parties determine how they will engage with 
humanitarian issues. In Bosnia, the warring parties did little to honour their commitments made in 
the Humanitarian Issues Working Group (Cutts, 1999). Groups such as the Taliban in 
Afghanistan or Renamo in Mozambique sometimes have little technical know-how regarding 
humanitarian programmes or of international humanitarian norms (Barnes, 1998; Donini, 2004). 
Other groups are better prepared. In the Sudanese context, the institution of Operation Lifeline 
Sudan prompted both the government and SPLM to create humanitarian wings (the SRRA and 
the HAC, respectively). Being staffed by technical workers with humanitarian expertise, distinct  
from military and political institutions, is seen to help engagement (Barbelet, 2008). Nevertheless, 
in Angola, both sides to the conflict had humanitarian institutions but nevertheless frequently 
sought to instrumentalise aid. 
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